The "Logic, Mathematics, and Philosophy" conference brings together philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians from both the analytic and European traditions in order to foster conversation about and advance the understanding of the key issues currently animating both traditions and having a broad impact in the academy and culture at large.
Conference Program
What I claim in this paper is that Deleuze's metaphysics, and the ontological commitments it seems to imply, can be understood in a deflationary way to be a metaphysics of the calculus that draws upon a conception of mathematics that is steeped in the implications of a subject naturalist pragmatist approach to the question of mathematical foundations. I argue that Deleuze's deflationary metaphysics is consonant in useful ways with the subject naturalist pragmatism proposed by Macarthur and Price (2007) . One preliminary consonance being that the conception of mathematics that Deleuze develops does not serve the same reductive ends that 'capital N Naturalism' requires, but rather it serves as a useful tool for modelling the nature of our relation to the world without the representational presuppositions of the latter. One way of characterizing this conception of mathematics is to look to the deflationary character of Carnap's philosophy of mathematics and the principle of tolerance that he advocates with respect to foundational questions in mathematics (Carnap 1937) . The aim of this paper is therefore to test the degree to which Deleuze's philosophy can be reconciled with Carnap's deflationary philosophy of mathematics and the subject naturalist approach to pragmatism put forward by Macarthur and Price. Bernhard Riemann's work has always been considered as one of the main examples, and sometimes as the inaugural example, of conceptual mathematics, although usually in juxtaposition to calculation rather than, as in this paper, logic. On the other hand, the nature of mathematical concepts, in Riemann and in general, has rarely been addressed, and even the concept of mathematical concept has rarely been defined. By using Riemann's concept of manifoldness (Mannigfaltigkeit) as the primary historical example, this paper will offer a new definition of mathematical concept and will consider the nature of modern mathematics as the creation of new concepts. This concept of mathematical concept follows but also departs from Deleuze and Guattari's concept of philosophical concepts, and more generally their understanding of the relationships between philosophy and mathematics, or among philosophy, mathematics, and logic. I shall also briefly discuss topos theory and noncommutative geometry from this perspective.
Jean-Michel Salanskis, Philosophy, University of Paris-Nanterre "Speaking Philosophically About Mathematics"
In the paper, I simply wish to give an overview of how two different ways of speaking philosophically about mathematics may be confronted, suggesting various discussions.
First, I shall define and stage my protagonists: analytic philosophy of mathematics on the one side, French philosophy of mathematics on the other side (temporal scope being limited to 20 th and 21 th century). In the following section, I shall compare both schools by asking them 'external' questions. In that perspective, I shall first examine how they dealt with elements of Kantian doctrine, at the same time taking them into account and dismissing them. And then I shall have a look on how they reacted to constructive conception of mathematics. In the last section, I will try a more personal approach. We can understand Zeno's paradoxes on motion (or more specifically "Achilles" and "The dichotomy") as an attempt to demonstrate an incompatibility between, on the one hand, motion -by which I mean something like the process of "going on", or the analytical A-time -and on the other hand a mathematical analysis of continuity. I will try in my presentation to focus on one aspect of the variety of contemporary solutions, that is, the "differend" over what we, as philosophers, should do with math (and, if I have time, with logic). The mainstream "analytical" solution is, basically, carte blanche given to Cantor's set theoretical treatment of infinity and the continuum, and a mathematization of reality as a logical or physical space (that is, set) over which univocal predication can be made. Motion as such is then driven out of reality. Of course, this fundamental gesture is not the only one available. Another starting point may lead to drive mathematics and mathematically construed entities out of reality, in the name of a philosophy of experience, whereas the problem could also be mathematical as such, the fault come from the set theoretical notion of actual infinities, and an Aristotelian solution be revived by the mathematical (constructivist) rebuttal of it. In every case, logic, that is to say the way we ought to use language and truth, is to be put at stake.
Chris Yeomans, Philosophy, Purdue University "Hegel on Real Numbers"
We attribute three major mathematical insights to Hegel: first, an understanding of the real numbers as the paradigmatic kind of number (which also accords with their role in physical measurement); second, a recognition that a quantitative relation has three elements (the two things being related and the relation itself), which is embedded in his conception of measure; and third, a recognition of the phenomenon of divergence of measures such as in secondorder phase transitions in which correlation length diverges.
